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THE GUARDIANS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE MODERN
STATE: POST’S REPUBLIC AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Ronald K.L. Collins* & David M. Skover**
On some grave questions, there is no difference to be split;
one does not look for a synthesis between verity and falsehood;
the sun does not rise in the east one day and in the west the
next.1
Christopher Hitchens’s maxim could be the epigraph quote to
Robert Post’s thought-provoking new book, Democracy, Expertise, and
Academic Freedom: A First Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern
State.2 While many might laud the democratization of knowledge and
the ideal of free and equal competition of ideas in the proverbial
marketplace, there are certain lines that cannot be crossed if the sun is to
continue to rise in the east. This is but another way of saying that
egalitarian principles cannot be allowed to run amok when it comes to
how we understand truth or, if you will, expert knowledge.
Robert Post’s examination of the First Amendment is reminiscent, if
only in broad strokes, of the late Allan Bloom’s critique of what he saw
* Harold S. Shefelman Scholar, University of Washington School of Law.
** Fredric C. Tausend Professor, Seattle University School of Law. The authors retain the copyright
in this article and authorize royalty-free reproduction for non-profit purposes, provided any such
reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the Washington Law Review.
1. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, LETTERS TO A YOUNG CONTRARIAN 21 (2001).
2. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012). The text of the book, including the introduction,
runs 104 pages. The endnotes constitute fifty-nine pages. The book grew out of the Julius Rosenthal
lectures, which Dean Post delivered at Northwestern University School of Law on April 16–18,
2008. Id. at vii. For an early critique of some of Post’s ideas, rendered before publication of Post’s
work, see generally Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and
Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free
Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1321–50 (2009). Presumably, Post’s reply to Redish’s
commentary is incorporated in his disapproving assessment of the autonomy or self-realization
theories of First Amendment normative value. See POST, supra, at 10–13, 23–25, 59, 112 n.78.
Finally, it bears noting that Post was the general counsel to the American Association of University
Professors between 1992 and 1994.
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as the assault on the academy owing to invasive egalitarian principles.
The liberal dean of the Yale Law School and the conservative professor
of political philosophy of the University of Chicago share some
conceptual ground.
If truth be known (Dare we put it that way?), this should not be
surprising. For where excellence (what the ancients called arete) is the
criterion, there has to be some rupture, at some point, of egalitarian
norms.3 One mark of a dauntless thinker is a willingness to defend the
verity of the earth’s circularity in a democratic culture in which the flatearth crowd demands compromise or synthesis. However much one may
agree or disagree with eye-opening books such as Post’s Democracy,
Expertise, and Academic Freedom or Bloom’s The Closing of the
American Mind, it is hard to deny one thing: that they force us to be
pensive, to pause and reflect on what we heretofore may have considered
to be gospel. Metaphorically, they are akin to Socrates speaking to his
Athenian jury—they alert us even as they challenge us. One of the
nobler purposes of the First Amendment is to inspire us to think
critically, including the way we think about the First Amendment. By
that measure, Dean Post has done us a great service: he has written a
book that pricks the mind at many a turn where feeble thinking passes
for received wisdom.
In his discussion of justice in The Republic, Plato’s Socrates insists
on a distinction between truth and opinion.4 Drawing on the thought of
the political theorist Hannah Arendt,5 Dean Post does something of the
same in his discussion of the First Amendment. He writes: “Arendt
allows us to see that First Amendment protections guarantee the
specifically political character of public opinion. To the extent that law
enforces claims of truth, it suppresses ‘political thinking’ by excluding
from political participation those who embrace a different truth from the

3. See ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 25, 88–90 (1987) (“There is one
thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes,
or says he believes, that truth is relative. If this belief is put to the test, one can count on the
students’ reaction: they will be uncomprehending.”); id. at 89 (“Harvard, Yale and Princeton are not
what they used to be—the last resorts of aristocratic sentiment within the democracy.”). By
suggesting this general analogy, we do not mean, of course, to imply that Dean Post would endorse
all or even many of the ideas advanced by the late Professor Bloom. Still, there is a similarity
between the two works, if only in the concern with the leveling effects that democracy can have on
how we view knowledge. In this respect, there is a bond among the liberal Robert Post, the
conservative Allan Bloom, and the radical Oxford-educated Christopher Hitchens.
4. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, bk. VI, at 188–90 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1968).
5. POST, supra note 2, at 118 n.10 (noting a distinction between “the philosopher” and “the
citizen” and therefore a distinction between expert knowledge and public opinion).
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state.”6 Hence, we are told, “‘[t]ruth . . . carries within itself an element
of coercion.’”7 We will soon say more about this general dichotomy. For
now, it is enough to suggest a larger point, namely, the nexus in Dean
Post’s thinking between political philosophy and free speech.
Throughout his book Post turns time and again to the thoughts of
philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas, Georg Wilhelm Hegel,
Immanuel Kant, Charles Sanders Peirce, John Rawls, Jean Jacques
Rousseau, and Carl Schmidt, to list but a few.8 Speaking broadly, this
juxtaposition of philosophy and free speech theory calls to mind the
approach that Alexander Meiklejohn takes in his seminal book Free
Speech and Its Relationship to Self Government.9 Whatever his
conceptual allegiance to Meiklejohn,10 Post does something similarly
bold—he ventures a theory of free speech. And that theory very much
concerns the role and rule of the First Amendment in a modern
democracy.
It is an old problem. Democracy is tied to doxa (the Greek word for
opinion), which affects how we perceive truth or understand knowledge.
And Dean Post is aware of that problem: “Within public discourse,
traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically transmutes claims
of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion.”11 If doctrine does so,
however, it may be that an all-too-accommodating egalitarian culture
often demands it. So why is that a problem? Consider, as Post has,12 the
case of state abortion laws that in effect require doctors “to give
untruthful, misleading and irrelevant information to patients.”13 For
those who demand accurate medical information, such laws are
anathema to the doctor-patient truth-telling relationship. Then again, to
those adamantly opposed to abortion, virtually anything that obstructs
the “murder” of unborn “babies” is justifiable and such laws surely
further that end. Thus, what subsidizes the unrestrained anti-abortion
agenda to set truth aside, what gives it wide currency, is religious belief,
6. Id. at 119 n.10 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 118 n.10 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 239 (1968)).
8. Id. at 21, 113 n.80 (Habermas); id. at 27, 28 (Hegel); id. at 6, 146 n.29, 152 n.60, 154 n.82
(Kant); id. at xii, 107 n.34 (Peirce); id. at 5 (Rawls).
9. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF GOVERNMENT
(1948).
10. See generally Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of
Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993).
11. POST, supra note 2, at 44.
12. See id. at 48, 131 n.67.
13. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1048 (D. Neb.
2010).
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which quite frequently is at odds with expert knowledge.14 Conceptually,
what is important here is that in a democratic regime, truth or scientific
knowledge is not always the coin of the realm.
Should the opinions of the many prevail over the knowledge of the
few? What to do? Enter Robert Post, who offers some thoughts for our
consideration. He posits a way to navigate the First Amendment’s value
of safeguarding public opinion from governmental censorship while at
the same time preserving a safe haven for knowledge (properly
understood). In the process, Post has a keen insight: though the First
Amendment is often hailed for the pursuit of truth or expert knowledge,
certain of its applications war against the force of that knowledge.
Phrased differently, free speech theories such as the marketplace of
ideas15 or doctrines such as content neutrality16 run counter to the
production of disciplinary knowledge, which presumes discrimination as
to the worth of ideas. If such theories and doctrines were unleashed in
the precincts of the academy, they would threaten the Enlightenment
14. This point is driven home remarkably well in Dean Post’s fascinating hypothetical about a
state’s attempt to ban misleading or false information concerning representations made by clerics to
their clergy that transubstantiation occurs during Holy Communion. See POST, supra note 2, at 134
n.83. Demands of scientific corroboration would never trump such assertions, even if linked to some
form of fundraising for the church. That is, inherent in the First Amendment itself is an anti-rational
value, that of the free exercise of religion, however unscientific. But the rationalist Post, if we may
tag him such, seems understandably hesitant to extend that irrational realm. Thus, he does not see
constitutional free speech protection extending to astrology or fortune-telling. See id. at 55, 136
nn.89–90 (“First Amendment scrutiny is not triggered by the censorship of deceptions, only by the
suppression of actual knowledge or information” unless religious beliefs are involved, in which case
such knowledge defers.). By contrast, consider Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, Inc. v.
Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119 (Cal. 1985), a case Post does not mention. Although the particular posture of
the case arose out of a fortune-telling ad placed in a newspaper, the majority spoke quite liberally in
how it understood the constitutional question before it, noting one “persuasive rationale” for
extending free speech protection to fortune-telling as being “that the life of the imagination and
intellect is of comparable import to the presentation of the political process.” Id. at 1124 (emphasis
added). Elsewhere, the majority painted with a broad brush and did not confine its constitutional
discussion to public expression: “[t]he City maintains that fortunetelling does not fall within the
protection of the Constitution because it does not concern or affect the political process. But this
argument fails to comprehend the broad scope and purpose of the constitutional guarantee of free
speech.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the court concluded that “fortunetelling deserves
protection.” Id. at 1124–25. Finally, the following passage suggests, yet again, that the court’s
analysis of the matter did not hinge on the communication being made in the public sphere: “some
persons believe they possess the power to predict what has not yet come to pass. When such persons
impart their beliefs to others, they are not acting fraudulently; they are communicating opinions
which, however dubious, are unquestionably protected by the Constitution.” Id. at 1126 (emphasis
added). While the court did not discount the possibility of a fraud analysis, it confined it to those
who practiced fortune-telling for a profit and did not believe in what they were doing. See id. at
1128–29.
15. See POST, supra note 2, at 6–8, 138 (rejecting marketplace of ideas theory).
16. See id. at 9–10 (rejecting certain applications of content-neutrality doctrine).
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raison d’etre of the university. This all points to Post’s understandable
concerns for and proposals to protect academic freedom.
*****
One of the preconditions for a vibrant and operational First
Amendment is a salutary degree of toleration, a willingness to step down
off of one’s pedestal and permit (or even invite) a generous dollop of
differing views. By that standard, Dean Post’s display of goodwill is
apparent in his exchange with the contributors to this Symposium.17
After all, he prefaces his replies to each of them with kindly
characterizations, labeling their contributions as “illuminating,”18 or
“concise and lucid,”19 or “fascinating and comprehensive,”20 or “fine and
careful”21 or even “shrewd and canny.”22 Taking our cue from such
generosity of spirit, we welcome the opportunity to comment in kind and
to raise a few affable questions (and tease out an occasional germ of an
idea) in response to some of the points discussed in Dean Post’s
discerning book and in his instructive reply to the contributors to this
Symposium. In these ways and others, we agree with Dean Post as to the
importance of honoring the Holmesian injunction of squaring what we
say about the law (how it is pigeonholed) with what we do with the law
(how the courts and culture actually use it). In this regard, it would be
most helpful to consider another injunction: others will tell you what the
world should be, but I will tell you what it is.23
17. Robert Post, Understanding the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 549 (2012). In an
important respect, Post’s reply may be viewed as a quasi-introduction to this symposium, insofar as
it synthesizes some of the main themes of each contributor. Of course, some contributors may take
exception to his summary and characterization of their ideas. Nonetheless, if for no other reason
than to avoid duplication, we need not undertake a similar synthesis here.
18. Id. at 549 (citing Bruce E. H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, A View from the First Amendment
Trenches: Washington State’s New Protections for Public Discourse and Democracy, 87 WASH. L.
REV. 495 (2012)).
19. Id. at 551 (citing Judge Thomas L. Ambro & Paul J. Safier, The First Amendment, the Courts,
and “Picking Winners,” 87 WASH. L. REV. 397 (2012)).
20. Id. at 553 (citing Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH.
L. REV. 445 (2012)).
21. Id. at 557 (citing Stephen I. Vladeck, Democratic Competence, Constitutional Disorder, and
the Freedom of the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 529 (2012)).
22. Id. at 560 (citing Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert Knowledge, and the Press, 87
WASH. L. REV. 409 (2012)).
23. This idea derives, if only in a qualified sense, from Machiavelli. See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI,
THE PRINCE 61 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1985) (1532) (“[It is] more fitting
to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it.”). For a related
Machiavellian maxim concerning Fortuna, consider what is set out in RONALD K.L. COLLINS &
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CLEARING SOME TERMINOLOGICAL BRUSH
If certainty is the end, clarity is the means. Words matter. And how
words are used and understood very much determines whether or not we
value ideas. This is particularly true for experts who trade in words, such
as legal scholars. After all, what is legal education if not a discipline in
careful writing and reading? Key to the art of legal reasoning is the
deliberate and critical parsing of text.
One of the potential challenges in appreciating Dean Post’s book is
grappling with some of the terminology central to his thesis. The clearer
one is about that terminology, the better one stands to evaluate Post’s
theories. If terms are unduly abstract, unnecessarily vague, inexplicably
contradictory, or uncommonly used, the interpretive process suffers.
Without venturing an opinion on that score, we wonder whether Post’s
audience may struggle in the attempt to attain clarity.
In order to develop his theory of free speech in such a way as to
rescue a modicum of truth or to safeguard expert knowledge, Robert
Post invites us to think about the ways in which a well-working
democracy requires protection for opinion and likewise demands
protection for the work product of the “[g]atekeepers” and “evaluators”
of knowledge.24 He does so by creating a dichotomy, but one that is
oppositional and complementary at the same time:


Democratic legitimation: “Democracy requires that
government action be tethered to public opinion. Because
public opinion can direct government action in an endless
variety of directions, it is impossible to specify in advance
which aspects of public opinion are ‘political’ and which are
not . . . . It is for this reason that First Amendment coverage
presumptively extends to all communications that form public
opinion.”25



Democratic competence: This “refers to the cognitive
empowerment of persons within public discourse, which in
part depends on their access to disciplinary knowledge.

DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 122 (2d ed. 2005).
24. POST, supra note 2, at 103 n.12 (quoting approvingly Ellen Messer-Davidow, Book Review,
17 SIGNS 676, 679 (1992)).
25. POST, supra note 2, at 19–20; see also id. at 28 (noting that public opinion must remain open
to the “subjective engagement of all, even of the idiosyncratic and eccentric. Fools and savants are
equally entitled to address the public”).
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Cognitive empowerment is necessary both for intelligent selfgovernance and for the value of democratic legitimation.”26
That democracy should legitimate the robust realm of public opinion
seems sound enough. After all, everyone from fools and savants27 to
priests and professionals should have an equal voice in the marketplace
of ideas, however imaginary the “truths” may be. Fair enough. But with
democratic competence the fit between the two words is far less obvious.
We need to stop and think about why that might be so.
It is a rule of rhetoric:28 If you associate one word with another, a
single thought might emerge no matter how irreconcilable the two words
otherwise are. In this respect, consider carefully how words are being
used here. On the one hand, if something is democratic, that means that
the demos (the many) have their way. On the other hand, if something is
deemed competent, it is because it is fitting (competere) to take the word
of the professional few (the knowledgeable experts) over that of the
uninformed many. By that lexical measure, competence cannot be
common. Therefore, democratic competence would seem to be an
oxymoron, something akin to “bright darkness” or “deafening silence.”
Such contradictory usage is acceptable as a matter of poetic license. But
is such license to be granted in the realm of legal language?
After all, oppositional terminology invites oppositional consequences.
If law’s language frowns upon poetic license, it is because terminology
such as “democratic competence” may be incongruous, obfuscatory, or
even sophistic. The way Dean Post presents it, competency itself is not
democratic; it is anti-democratic. That is, the rule of expertise does not
turn on democratic will. Moreover, aligning competency with
democracy obfuscates the paternalism inherent in the rule of elite
experts. In other words, the fact that something is labeled democratic
does not necessarily make it so. To this, Dean Post might respond that
26. Id. at 33–34. Importantly, Post adds:
To theorize the value of democratic competence is to confront a seeming paradox. Democratic
legitimation requires that the speech of all persons be treated with toleration and equality.
Democratic competence, by contrast, requires that speech be subject to a disciplinary authority
that distinguishes good ideas from bad ones. Yet democratic competence is necessary for
democratic legitimation. Democratic competence is thus both incompatible with democratic
legitimation and required by it. This is an awkward conclusion that should prompt us to think
hard about how democratic competence can be reconciled with democratic legitimation.
Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
27. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 23, at 9–24 (discussing the irrational excesses of the
American popular commercial entertainment culture).
28. To be precise, perhaps it is more a functional rule than a formal one. The Aristotelian
understanding of rhetoric, however, would not countenance such usage.
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the juxtaposition of democratic competency derives from the notion that
the populace is the beneficiary of expertise. But this may prove to be an
unstable alliance. As we will discuss later, the uninformed demos has
done and may do much to undermine the norms of the informed
professionals, if only because the many may not view their self-interest
as do the few. And when that occurs, the domain of democratic
legitimation (the realm of opinion) trumps the domain of democratic
competence (the realm of expert knowledge).
A similar demand for greater clarity might be made as to other key
terminology in Post’s work. For example, consider the following:


Expert knowledge: What is it? Dean Post tells us what it is
not: “Expert knowledge is neither practical reason nor is it a
collection of atomistic facts.”29 He then tells us what it is:
“Expert knowledge arises from the capacity to arrange
experience in dependable and useful ways. It is produced
through the application of complex disciplinary practices.”30
To this, he adds, “[w]hereas within public discourse the
political imperatives of democracy require that persons be
regarded as equals and as autonomous, outside public
discourse the law commonly regards persons as dependent,
vulnerable, and hence unequal”31—thus, they must rely on
expert knowledge. Finally, this all points to a basic question:
“How then should we conceive the relationship between the
First Amendment and the production and dissemination of
expert knowledge?”32

At the outset, one might wonder: who is an “expert” and whose
expertise counts for democratic competency? Although Dean Post
clearly values academic experts, what about governmental experts33 or
29. POST, supra note 2, at 95; see also id. at ix (discussing the distinction between practical
reason, which may be self-acquired, and expert knowledge, which is obtained from third parties
with disciplinary expertise).
30. Id. at 95.
31. Id. at 23 (endnote omitted).
32. Id. at 25.
33. For example, what about national security experts at the Department of Defense? In the
famous Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), such experts argued that national security
would be seriously compromised by the release of a Defense Department study on American
relations with Vietnam circa 1945–1967. See id. at 718. Had federal judges deferred to the expert
knowledge of these officials, the First Amendment press claim vouchsafed in that case would have
lost. See generally RONALD K.L. COLLINS, NUANCED ABSOLUTISM: FLOYD ABRAMS AND THE
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experts in the institutional press? As to the latter, Post appears reluctant
to endorse the following proposition that Professor Stephen Vladeck
tenders:
It is relatively easy to envision journalism as one of the
disciplines whose practices should receive First Amendment
coverage under Post’s framework. After all, journalism makes a
substantial contribution to the value of democratic competence;
in many respects, there may be no field that more directly
advances “the cognitive empowerment of persons within public
discourse.”34
In contrast, Post is ambivalent about the status of the press, calling it “a
deeply ambiguous institution”35 that serves both as “a mouthpiece for
partisan politics”36 and other opinion mongers and as a disinterested and
professional organization “whose mission is to educate the public about
newsworthy matters.”37 Post would rather have the institutional
autonomy of the press “justified without appealing to the value of
democratic competence,”38 if only because “we cannot determine the
substance of our constitutional doctrine [regarding press expertise] until
we are first clear about the ‘social ends’ we wish [the press] to
achieve.”39 Could not the same argument be leveled against many
experts, particularly those outside the academy?
Dean Post’s “mouthpiece” argument raises other intriguing questions.
What happens when experts, even within the academy, act as partisan
mouthpieces? Or what happens when university research experts become

FIRST AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2012) (discussing the conflicting expertise of the press and
governmental officials in the Pentagon Papers Case). In his contribution to this Symposium,
Professor Stephen Vladeck makes a similar point, when he proposes that Dean Post’s theory of
democratic competence might have “a downside with regard to freedom of the press, at least where
national security secrets are concerned,” because “it is not difficult to imagine government
arguments that government officials, rather than journalists, possess the relevant disciplinary
knowledge when it comes to disseminating national security secrets.” Vladeck, supra note 21, at
533–34 (emphasis in original). As to this challenge to his theory, Post remains silent in his reply.
34. Vladeck, supra note 21, at 540 (emphasis in original) (quoting POST, supra note 2, at 34).
Importantly, two other contributors offer similar arguments for the inclusion of the press as
institutional sites for the generation of expert knowledge. See Blocher, supra note 22, at 439–40;
Horwitz, supra note 20, at 440.
35. Post, supra note 17, at 558.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 559. Calling on the “checking value” of the institutional press first articulated by
Professor Vincent Blasi, Post notes that the First Amendment might protect the press because it
could “‘check’ the possibility of governmental abuse.” Id.
39. Id. at 560 (paraphrasing Justice Holmes).

04 -- Foreword FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

378

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/4/2012 9:09 PM

[Vol. 87:369

mouthpieces for corporate interests? Put otherwise, if there is credible
evidence that an expert, within or outside of the academy, is not
genuinely disinterested40 or not functionally defining and nourishing
disciplinary knowledge itself, does that individual thereby lose his or her
Postian credentials?41


Constitutional sociology of knowledge: To protect democratic
competence, Post tells us, courts must “attribute
constitutional status to the disciplinary practices by which
expert knowledge is itself created.”42 To do so, they must
develop “a constitutional sociology of knowledge.”43 That is,
to establish which disciplinary practices produce knowledge
(e.g., medicine, chemistry, and law) and which do not (e.g.,
astrology and palmistry),44 judges must articulate
determinative “criteria.”45 The corpus of such criteria is, we
assume, what is meant by a “sociological construction of
knowledge,”46 which itself involves courts in the enterprise of
understanding and evaluating “epistemic cultures.”47 Such an

40. See Gary Edmond, Judging the Scientific and Medical Literature: Some Legal Implications of
Changes to Biomedical Research and Publication, 28 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 523, 523 (2008)
(noting that “[o]ver the last two decades, judges (and regulators) . . . have increased their reliance on
published medical and scientific [research],” and asserting that they should take account of recent
studies indicating that corporate sponsorship heavily biases such research). Two cursory points:
first, this is not the contemporary judicial practice; and second, if it were, what would that portend
for First Amendment adjudication regarding democratic competence in scenarios where university
research is underwritten by corporate subsidies?
41. See POST, supra note 2, at 75 (“[U]niversities foster the disinterested pursuit of disciplinary
knowledge.” (emphasis in original)); id. at 150 n.53 (“Common sense identifies the term discipline
with the content of an academic enterprise.” (emphasis in original) (quoting approvingly David
Shumway, Disciplinarity, Corporatization, and the Crisis: A Dystopian Narrative, J. MIDWEST
MODERN LANGUAGE ASS’N, Winter–Spring 1999, at 2)).
42. POST, supra note 2, at 55.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 96. Notably, at one point Dean Post declares that law “probably would” be deemed a
disciplinary practice. Id. (emphasis added). At another point, however, he maintains that “the
professional practices of lawyers produce the kind of knowledge that advances the value of
democratic competence . . . .” Id. at 56. Given the doctrinal confusion that Post himself flags in the
First Amendment realm—where “[d]octrine proliferates endlessly and meaninglessly”—is it any
wonder that Post equivocates over law’s status as a discipline analogous to medicine or chemistry?
Post, supra note 2, at 549. After all, for Post, some of First Amendment decisional law is a “barrage
of inconsistent and abstract doctrine.” Id.
45. POST, supra note 2, at 96.
46. Id. at 56.
47. Id. at 116 n.100 (quoting KAREN KNORR CETINA, EPISTEMIC CULTURES: HOW THE SCIENCES
MAKE KNOWLEDGE 8 (1999)).
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undertaking, Dean Post concedes, will involve the judiciary in
“deep and intractable questions.”48
In light of the above, is it not likely that judges might pause before
accepting the obligations that development of a sociology of knowledge
would impose upon them? Would the product of this arduous endeavor
be any less abstract than the First Amendment doctrines that are so
unsettling to Dean Post? Understandably, in this admittedly murky area,
Judge Thomas Ambro and Paul Safier are troubled by the prospect of
establishing such a sociology of knowledge49—one that would require
deciding, for example:





which disciplinary practices are credible and which not;
which experts might be authoritative and which not;
which bodies of expert knowledge are relevant or not to the
adjudication of a specific First Amendment claim;
or what the constitutional status of expert knowledge is over
time as it is challenged by competing theories.

Are such inquiries really analogous to the well-developed standards of
care in the garden-variety torts case? Dean Post appears to believe so,50
when he argues that courts “must pick a ‘winner’ in order to ascertain
liability” whenever “expert testimony conflicts.”51 Can the matter be left
48. POST, supra note 2, at 58. While it may be apparent that a constitutional sociology of
knowledge will involve “deep” theoretical and doctrinal questions, is Dean Post serious when he
also claims that it poses “intractable” questions?—that is, questions that may, by some definitions of
the word, prove to be judicially unmanageable?
49. See Judge Thomas L. Ambro & Paul J. Safier, The First Amendment, the Courts, and
“Picking Winners,” 87 WASH. L. REV. 397, 402 (2012).
50. See Post, supra note 17, at 552. Arguing that judges are accustomed to evaluating expert
testimony, Dean Post refers to dicta in a passage of Judge Ambro’s opinion in Natale v. Camden
County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 579 (3d Cir. 2003), in the following way: Judge Ambro
“accurately observes that ‘in the typical malpractice case, the duty of care, or the standard of
practice to which the defendant-practitioner failed to adhere must be established by expert
testimony.’” Post, supra, at 552 (quoting Natale, 318 F.3d at 579) (citations omitted). Though Post
does not mention it, the Natale Court held that there was no need to assess the reliability of claims
to expertise, since that particular case was governed by the “common knowledge” exception to the
affidavit requirement. Natale, 318 F.3d at 578.
51. Post, supra note 17, at 552. Courts appear to be doing much more than just picking winners
among expert witnesses called by the parties to a lawsuit. Even at the loftiest level of our nation’s
judiciary, it is not uncommon for the justices to look beyond the expert record and rely on their own
“in-house” research derived mainly from the Internet. See, e.g., Alli Orr Larsen, Confronting
Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009904 (arguing generally that changes in
electronic technology have and will alter judicial fact-finding processes). To what extent, one
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thus? Consider, for example, Justice Stephen Breyer’s cautionary note:
“[M]ost judges lack the scientific training that might facilitate the
evaluation of scientific claims or the evaluation of expert witnesses who
make such claims.”52 Do those to whom the burden of developing a
sociology of knowledge is assigned have the requisite expertise to
accomplish the task?
In fairness to Dean Post, his undertaking is a Herculean one in which
it is difficult to move a weighty conceptual rock along the steep terrain
of our modern First Amendment. Given the enormity of his task,
definitional precision is difficult to attain. Hopefully, the questions we
raise will aid Post’s readers to untangle a few knotty threads of thought.
THE HARM PRINCIPLE
Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom identifies two
normative values for our system of freedom of speech to serve.
Theoretically, the First Amendment should aim both to promote the
democratic legitimation of opinions and to buttress the domain of truth
or expert knowledge. What Dean Post rejects as a worthy telos for
expressive liberties, however, is the protection of speech for speech’s
sake. “Misled by the seeming simplicity and generality of First
Amendment doctrine,” he asserts, “we imagine that the goal of First
Amendment doctrine is to protect speech itself. But in fact nothing could
be further from the truth.”53
Our modern constitutional culture, however, might appear to value
speech for its own sake. As Chief Justice John Roberts put it: “Most of
what we say to one another lacks ‘religious, political, scientific,
wonders, will judicial reliance on online sources invite factual errors, unanticipated biases, and
serious credibility issues—and all of this without any meaningful check from the parties’ experts.
What is one to make of this? Can we assume that such in-house knowledge is tantamount to Dean
Post’s “expert knowledge” in the realm of democratic competence? Moreover, in the judicial
construction of a “sociology of knowledge,” might it not be necessary, as Professor Larsen
recommends, to develop a new set of procedural standards to govern the digital path of the law?
52. See Stephen Breyer, Introduction to COMM. ON SCI., TECH., AND LAW, REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 4 (3d ed., 2011). This point is further illustrated by the admonition of U.S.
District Court Judge William Acker, Jr., who charged:
Unless and until there is a national register of experts on various subjects and a method by
which they can be fairly compensated, the federal amateurs wearing black robes will have to
overlook their new gatekeeping function lest they assume the intolerable burden of becoming
experts themselves in every discipline known to the physical and social sciences, and some as
yet unknown but sure to blossom.
Id. at 8 (quoting Letter from Judge William Acker, Jr., Federal District Court Judge, Northern
District of Alabama, to the Judicial Conference of the United States et al. (Jan. 2, 1998)).
53. Post, supra note 17, at 551.
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educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value’ (let alone serious
value), but it is still sheltered from government regulation.”54 Thus, in
recent times the Supreme Court has sustained the First Amendment
claims of those who traffic in animal cruelty videos55 and in violent
video games.56 It is within this rough and tumble realm that Dean Post’s
system of democratic legitimation operates; it is within this sphere that
public opinion, no matter how vile or mindless, is allowed to be formed
and have its say. That is what the First Amendment legitimates in Post’s
republic.
Nonetheless, Dean Post maintains that “[e]ntrenched First
Amendment doctrine affirms that ‘there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact.’”57 As far as “[e]ntrenched First Amendment
doctrine” goes, it is not at all clear that statements of fact, regardless of
their value, are likely to be denied free speech protection simply because
of their falsity. Robert Corn-Revere, a noted First Amendment lawyer
who recently filed an amicus brief in United States v. Alvarez58 on behalf
of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and twenty-three
news organizations, offered a different explanation. He argued in his
brief: “It is not enough for a statement to be false or even knowingly
false to exclude it from First Amendment protection. This Court has
‘never held that a person can be liable for defamation merely for
spreading knowingly false statements.’”59 The point, he added, is that
“First Amendment exceptions for untruthful speech, such as defamation
or fraud, exist not just because the expression is false, but because of
some demonstrable harm.”60 Moreover, Corn-Revere emphasized,
“Gertz underscores this point. The Court stressed that the state interest
underlying the law of libel ‘is the compensation of individuals for the

54. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)).
55. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577.
56. Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
57. POST, supra note 2, at 29 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
58. No. 11-210 (U.S. argued Feb. 22, 2012); see Jeffery C. Barnum, Comment, False Valor:
Amending the Stolen Valor Act to Conform with the First Amendment’s Fraudulent Speech
Exception, 86 WASH. L. REV. 841, 859–61 (2011) (describing Alvarez’s history and reasoning).
59. Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and Twenty-Three News Media
Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, United States v. Alvarez (U.S. No.
11-210 argued Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter “Reporters Committee Amicus Brief”] (internal citations
omitted).
60. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1206–09 (9th Cir.
2010)).
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harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.’”61 Finally, CornRevere counsels, even where torts involving false statements are
involved, there must be some kind of real injury, some actual harm.62
We stress what we label as “the harm principle” because we think it
better explains much of the First Amendment doctrine that Dean Post
views as unconvincing or meaningless. If, indeed, those in the free
speech community suffer from a kind of “First Amendment
hypertrophy,”63 might it be that First Amendment theories are so swollen
with value-laden norms that they fail to take sufficient account of the
obvious? Could it be that the presence or likelihood of real harm, even if
obliquely addressed, is what ultimately drives much, if not all, of free
speech analysis?64 Even in Post’s realm of democratic legitimation, can
61. Reporters Committee Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz,
418 U.S. at 341).
62. See Reporters Committee Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 17–18. Reporting on the oral
arguments in the case, Lyle Denniston observed: “The Solicitor General had claimed that the Court
had declared that ‘calculated falsehoods’ are entitled to no constitutional protection, but Kennedy
retorted: ‘I can’t find that in our cases; it is a sweeping proposition.’” Lyle Denniston, Argument
Recap: Rewriting a Law to Save It, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 22, 2012, 1:28 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=139371. Perhaps this explains why it is that, during the oral
arguments in Alvarez, some of the justices felt the need to analogize the so-called harm in the case
to that suffered in a trademark violation. See id.
63. Post, supra note 17, at 549.
64. In this regard, First Amendment scholar Frederick Schauer might well respond that formal
free speech doctrine has been too little driven by rigorous judicial consideration of consequential
harms. In an insightful article forthcoming in The Supreme Court Review, Professor Schauer posits
that “the question of harm is one of huge First Amendment significance, and it has been one that has
largely been avoided” by the Supreme Court. Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment,
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 42) [hereinafter Harm(s) and the First Amendment], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009344.
Providing
a
typology
that
characterizes the different harms involved in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577
(2010) (classifying the injury to animals in crush videos as “participant harm”), Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (classifying the emotional distress alleged by the family arising
from the anti-gay protest at a military funeral as “listener harm”), and Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Associations, 564 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (classifying the violence purportedly
fostered by video games as “third-party” or “persuasion harm”), Schauer explains that
“[d]isaggregating the domain of speech-associated harms” is crucial for conscientious and effective
First Amendment analysis. Schauer, supra, at 35. Notably, he concludes:
We take an important [first] step when we recognize that much First Amendment argument is
about consequential and often harmful speech, but the necessary second step is to understand
the nature of those harms, for without that we cannot hope to evaluate (or generate) the data
that would enable courts to determine the extent of the harms involved, and whether the
doctrine should allow any redress against them.
Id. at 37–38. To the extent that our discussion here implicates the topic of harm, we are in
meaningful agreement with Professor Schauer’s first step of analysis. In contrast, his concerns that
the Court has too severely downplayed the significance of harms are less germane to our immediate
purposes. While we may disagree with him over the relative magnitude and legal significance of
any purported harm, we believe that Professor Schauer begins his First Amendment analysis at the

04 -- Foreword FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

THE GUARDIANS OF KNOWLEDGE

6/4/2012 9:09 PM

383

it be reasonably denied that the demos can only have its say as long as it
causes no harm sufficient to trigger a compelling governmental interest
to override it? Would not the same harm principle hold true in the realm
of democratic competence? If so, one might ask: Would not the same
doctrinal results be produced in both domains even without Dean Post’s
theories, provided one could point to some real harm?
The examples Post tenders as to law’s regulation of falsity flowing
from the lips of doctors, dentists, lawyers, corporate directors, and the
like65 are offered to support the claim that the public needs to depend on
reliable and truthful information from experts. Fair enough. But, as with
the line of First Amendment cases discussed above, does such regulation
have less to do with simple falsity than with the expectation that reliance
on that falsity would be detrimental, would likely cause real harm?
Could a plaintiff prevail in a medical or dental malpractice case if there
were lying without physical injury? Or could a plaintiff win a securities
fraud case simply by proving falsity without demonstrating economic
losses? Is it not fair to assume that what best explains the doctrinal
results in all of these cases is the presence or absence of real harm rather
than the valueless character of falsehoods?

right place. See also SPEECH AND HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani Maitra &
Mary Kate McGowan, eds., forthcoming, 2012) (studying the relationship between speech and harm
from various perspectives—e.g., philosophy, sociology, political science, feminist theory, and legal
theory).
65. See POST, supra note 2, at 12, 23. There is a curiously old-fashioned quality in many of Dean
Post’s paradigmatic examples for governmental regulation of falsity, at least insofar as he primarily
focuses on face-to-face, for-fee, and in-office consultations between professional experts and their
individual clients. After all, we live in the age of the Internet, as is evidenced by the ascendancy of
Wikipedia, the people’s online encyclopedia, over the 244 year-old print-based Encyclopaedia
Britannica. See Joe Palazzolo, Which Federal Appeals Court Cites Wikipedia Most Often?, WALL
ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2012, 7:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/04/23/which-federalappeals-court-cites-wikipedia-most/ (reporting on incidence of citations to Wikipedia in federal
cases); Julie Bosman, After 244 Years, Encyclopaedia Britannica Stops the Presses, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 13, 2012, 5:54 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/after-244-yearsencyclopaedia-britannica-stops-the-presses/ (reporting that Encyclopaedia Britannica has ceased
publishing). For many of the denizens of the Internet, are the paradigms for “expert knowledge” not
substantially transfigured? For example, rather than pay for in-office expert medical advice, are the
less affluent or the young not more likely to turn, first and foremost, to free online sites such as
www.webmd.com, www.myelectronicmd.com, or www.askthedoctor.com in order to diagnose their
allergies, asthma, fibromyalgia, depression, osteoporosis, or venereal diseases? Ironically, given the
capacity to cross-check multiple resources, is it not conceivable that web-based medical information
may sometimes prove more reliable than that of affordable, second- or third-rate medical providers?
Assuming such websites would fall outside of Post’s domain of democratic competence, is it not
possible that much of our future medical diagnosis and treatment will occur within the realm of
democratic legitimacy, in which governmental regulation of falsity is not to be tolerated?
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TRADING IN TRUTH
Decades before Robert Post came to Yale Law School to serve as its
dean, a visionary scholar, Robert Maynard Hutchins, held that position.
After serving as dean of the law school66 for a short period in the 1920s,
Hutchins went on to become a famed educator67 and president of the
University of Chicago, which he helped to transform into one of this
nation’s great universities. Unafraid of real diversity in thought,
Hutchins launched bold ideas68 and recruited many great teachers and
scholars to Chicago, ranging from the political philosopher Leo Strauss69
to the constitutionalist C. Herman Pritchett.70 And Hutchins was a
vigorous defender of academic freedom;71 for example, he steadfastly
opposed faculty loyalty oaths in the 1950s.72 More than others, either
then or now, Hutchins championed the values of higher education.
Precisely because he felt so strongly about the future of education,
Hutchins minced no words when it came to confronting ruinous forces
that compromised the pursuit of unfettered knowledge. As he put it in
1958:
In the last generation the universities have become service
stations rather than beacons. Their principal interest appears to
be money, and they will engage in any activity that seems likely
to provide it. So we are without centers of independent thought
and criticism. The highly specialized and diffuse character of the
universities prevents them from becoming centers, and their
eagerness to sell themselves prevents them from being
66. See MILTON MEYER, ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS: A MEMOIR 59–80 (1993). Hutchins
became dean of the Yale Law School, from which he graduated, at age 29. Id. at 61.
67. See MARY ANN DZUBACK, ROBERT M. HUTCHINS: PORTRAIT OF AN EDUCATOR (1991).
68. For example, Hutchins suggested that law might be taught in conjunction with economics. See
HARRY S. ASHMORE, UNSEASONABLE TRUTHS: THE LIFE OF ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS 305,
536 (1989).
69. In 1949, Strauss accepted a position at the University of Chicago, where he taught until his
retirement in 1967. He wrote many books on political philosophy and enjoyed a devoted and
influential following. See ANCIENTS AND MODERNS: ESSAYS IN THE TRADITION OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY IN HONOR OF LEO STRAUSS (Joseph Cropsey, ed., 1964); LEO STRAUSS, THE
STRAUSSIANS, AND THE AMERICAN REGIME (Kenneth L. Deutsche & John A. Murley, eds., 1999).
70. Pritchett was chairman of the Political Science Department at Chicago from 1948 to 1955 and
again from 1958 to 1964. In later years, he taught at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His
writings include CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT (1954), THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(1959), THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1963), and THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY
IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES (1948).
71. See ASHMORE, supra note 68, at 128–32, 242–43, 245, 248 (1989).
72. See, e.g., ROBERT M. O’NEIL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE WIRED WORLD: POLITICAL
EXTREMISM, CORPORATE POWER AND THE UNIVERSITY 24–25 (2008).
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independent. This process has gone very far and seems
irreversible. It is altogether unlikely that the American
universities can become centers of independent thought.73
Strong words, indeed. But if the “vitality of an intellectual
community” was to survive, argued Hutchins, universities must
construct a wide and deep moat between themselves and the captains of
commerce, who would have universities “limit themselves” to the
business of business.74 Unless the caretakers of universities—especially
its presidents, deans, and heads of departments and professional
schools—committed themselves to keeping their institutions largely free
of such corrupting influences, the result would be nothing short of a
“crisis in values,”75 one so profound as to compromise the value of
“pursuing the truth for its own sake.”76 The problem of commerce
demeaning the pursuit of knowledge in a university was especially
troublesome insofar as it invited the “excesses of experts and
specialists,”77 who were too often willing to place self-profit over the
collective good of liberal education.
The issue of the commercialization of knowledge, raised by President
Hutchins more than a half-century ago, is far more serious today than it
was in his day. By comparison, his era seems like an age of innocence.
We think it salutary to rekindle Hutchins’s message because it speaks
forcefully to a point inextricably linked to Dean Post’s interest in a
theory of free speech designed to advance knowledge and safeguard
academic freedom. Such a theory, if it is to have any meaningful staying
power, cannot be oblivious to the obvious: it cannot ignore the
commercialization of knowledge. It cannot venture to defend education
and knowledge in a setting that restructures the former by redefining the
domain of the latter. That is, if we are to be genuinely serious about
conserving (and that is the word) the kind of values Dean Post urges us
to preserve, we must not conflate academic freedom with entrepreneurial
freedom. Hence, for example, when medical78 and pharmaceutical79
73. Robert Maynard Hutchins, Ideas, Institutions, and American Liberty, in ASPECTS OF
LIBERTY: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO ROBERT E. CUSHMAN 3, 10–11 (Milton R. Konvitz & Clinton
Rossiter, eds., 1958) (emphasis added).
74. ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, THE LEARNING SOCIETY 117 (1968).
75. See id. at 35.
76. Id. at 116.
77. Id. at 108.
78. See Patricia C. Kuszler, Curing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Impossible Dreams
and Harsh Realities, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 115, 115–16, 118 (2001) (“Studies demonstrate that
physician prescriptive practices are significantly affected by dollars and other benefits provided to
them by the pharmaceutical industry. . . . Although the federal government has been the primary
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schools become more concerned with securing corporate research
funding than with advancing the knowledge of science, education is
undermined. More importantly, expert knowledge is commercialized to
the point of creating real ethical conflicts in values.80 Worse still, some
of the values most in jeopardy are those of academic freedom.81 When
commercialized knowledge masquerades as independent thought, it soon
lays claim to protection in the name of academic freedom. Genuine
knowledge suffers an opaque death whenever such things occur. Given
that, why would any authentic educator defend the excesses of these
commercial enterprises?

source of funding for clinical research in the past, it has been superseded by private industry in the
last decade.” (citations omitted)); see also Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 342
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1516 (2000) (“Academic medical institutions are themselves growing
increasingly beholden to industry.”).
79. See Jeff Stier, Does Pharmaceutical Industry Funding Bias Research?, CARDIOLOGY NEWS
(Feb. 1, 2009),
http://www.ecardiologynews.com/index.php?id=8736&type=98&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=86829&cHas
h=da03e20e36 (“The pharmaceutical industry funds slightly more than half of the research being
done today. . . . Industry-sponsored studies, when published in peer-reviewed journals, are four
times more likely to be favorable to the sponsor’s drug, device, or treatment than are non-industry
sponsored studies, according to a meta-analysis of 30 studies.” (citation omitted)). As to the
question of experts, the following is noteworthy:
The [Food and Drug Administration] convened a panel to look at the question of whether or
not VIOXX should be marketed. The non-industry connected members of the panel voted 14–8
to keep the drug off the market until the issue was sorted out. The panelists who came from
industry voted to bring it back to the market.
Id. See also John Abramson & Barbara Starfield, The Effect of Conflict of Interest on Biomedical
Research and Clinical Practice Guidelines: Can We Trust the Evidence in Evidence-Based
Medicine?, 18 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 414, 414 (2005) (“[A]mong even the highest quality
clinical research . . . [,] the odds are 5.3 times greater that commercially funded [pharmacology]
studies will support their sponsors’ products than noncommercially funded studies.”).
80. See Barbara J. Bird et al., Conflicts in the Commercialization of Knowledge: Perspectives
from Science and Entrepreneurship, 17 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY & PRAC., Summer 1993, at
57.
81. See, e.g., William Graham, Academic Freedom or Commercial License?, in THE CORPORATE
CAMPUS: COMMERCIALIZATION AND THE DANGERS TO CANADA’S COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
23, 30 (James L. Turk ed., 2000) (addressing the failure of universities to protect real academic
freedom when doing so would conflict with the interests of private corporations that give money to
universities); see also Wendy S. Pachter et al., Corporate Funding and Conflicts of Interest: A
Primer for Psychologists, 62 AM. PSYCHOL. 1005, 1005 (2007) (recommending, among other
things, that the American Psychological Association “develop explicit policies . . . to preserve the
independence of psychological science”); Stephen D. Sugarman, Conflicts of Interest in the Roles of
the University Professor, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 255, 261–64 (2005) (describing
increased university-imposed disclosure requirements to make conflicts of interest more
transparent). Notably, law journals are among the very few of scholarly periodicals that uniformly
lack any conflict of interest rules and disclosure requirements. See Ronald K.L. Collins, A Letter on
Scholarly Ethics, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 139, 141–42 (1995) (calling on law reviews to create conflictof-interest policies).

04 -- Foreword FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

THE GUARDIANS OF KNOWLEDGE

6/4/2012 9:09 PM

387

We will return to this issue in a moment. Before we do, however, we
think it fair to let Dean Post weigh in on his own, at least in a general
sense. Stressing the point, Post lauds the idea that universities should
“foster the disinterested pursuit of disciplinary knowledge . . . .”82 Like
Hutchins before him, Post endorses the notion of independent centers of
learning in which the primary goal is the “preservation, advancement,
and dissemination of knowledge.”83 Faithful to that principle, Post
argues that faculty experts should be no more beholden to the trustees of
their college than “are . . . judges subject to the control of the president,
with respect to their decisions . . . .”84 In other words, there needs to be a
firewall, which the First Amendment may sometimes buttress. It is
precisely that firewall that makes universities, in Post’s words, “unique
institutions”85 worthy of the public trust.
Against that backdrop, let us now revisit the topic of the
commercialization of knowledge. We begin with Derek Bok, the former
president of Harvard University. Like President Hutchins before him,
President Bok was blunt in his assessment of the problem: “The
commercialization of higher education is not a terrible disaster looming
on the near horizon, but an accomplished fact—or, in the language of
business, a done deal.”86 In the mind of the man who once served as
head of the most prestigious college in the land for more than two
decades, the problem that Robert Maynard Hutchins warned against had
come into full bloom.
Colleges and universities, once seen as bastions of ideas serving the
common good, have increasingly transformed into citadels of industry
serving the cause of private profit. In this commercialized environment,
medical schools produce bio-medical studies that are unduly influenced
by industry;87 brilliant researchers earn lucrative consulting fees;88 and
82. POST, supra note 2, at 75 (emphasis in original); see also supra text accompanying notes 41–
42.
83. POST, supra note 2, at 63 (quoting David Madsen, Review Essay: The American University in
a Changing Society: Three Views, 91 AM. J. EDUC. 356, 361 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
84. Id. at 92 (quoting AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE (1915) (internal quotation marks omitted), reprinted
in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 291, 295 (9th ed. 2001)).
85. Id. at 75.
86. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 18 (2003).
87. See, e.g., Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454 (2003) (“Financial relationships
among industry, scientific investigators, and academic institutions are widespread. Conflicts of
interest arising from these ties can influence biomedical research in important ways.”).
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distinguished professors take title to industry-endowed chairs.89 For Bok,
blurring the line between the academy and the marketplace “threatens to
change the character of the university in ways that limit its freedom, sap
its effectiveness, and lower its standing in . . . society.”90 Furthermore,
secrecy is often demanded by corporate entities that pay dearly for
certain kinds of scientific investigation that can give rise to patents or
trade secrets. When that occurs, Bok added, the effect is to “inhibit
scientific progress . . . by limiting the flow of information and ideas that
investigators need in order to advance their work.”91
To be sure, the brave new entrepreneurialism that has become so
commonplace in higher education can produce some societal benefits,
even important ones. We do not deny that. Our point is a measured one:
the coin of commerce is overvalued in the academy today; too often
there are neither effective checks on such power nor even much
incentive to curb it in meaningful ways.92 A report from a Pennsylvania
State University (Penn State or PSU) professor (affiliated with the
Center for the Study of Higher Education) to the Office of the Vice

88. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris & Benedict Carey, Researchers Fail to Reveal Full Drug Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2008, at A1 (revealing that a renowned, university-employed child psychiatrist
“whose work has helped fuel an explosion in the use of powerful antipsychotic medicines in
children earned at least $1.6 million in consulting fees from drug makers from 2000 to 2007 but for
years did not report much of this income to university officials.”).
89. See, e.g., Duff Wilson, Patching a Wound: Working to End Conflicts at Harvard Medical,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at B1 (noting three industry-endowed chairs created with $8 million from
sleep research companies).
90. BOK, supra note 86, at 207. Even those somewhat sympathetic to university-industry
alliances believe that too much ground has already been lost to commercialization. See, e.g.,
ROBERT ZEMSKY ET AL., REMAKING THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: MARKET-SMART AND MISSIONCENTERED 87 (2005); Adrianna Kezar, Is There a Way Out?: Examining the Commercialization of
Higher Education, 79 J. HIGHER EDUC. 473, 479 (2008) (book review) (“Without frameworks for
navigating the problems of commercialization that take into account a systems and cultural
perspective and that are a bit skeptical of markets, I believe we will continue to merely tweak the
edges and never address the core of the problem.”).
91. BOK, supra note 86, at 65, quoted in Sara Rimer, A Warning Against Mixing Commerce and
Academics, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 2003, at D9 (interview with Bok). Ms. Rimer began her article
with the following illustration: “College presidents always need more money, and in the 1980’s
[sic], during Derek Bok’s tenure as president of Harvard, a major pharmaceutical firm made him a
tempting financial offer.” Rimer, supra. That offer is set out below:
[The pharmaceutical company] would pay $1 million a year to Harvard Medical School, along
with generous fees for participating faculty members, to produce a series for cable television
on recent developments in cardiology. It was willing to allow a disclaimer during every
program making it clear that Harvard was not endorsing any of the company’s products as long
as it could run its advertisements during various points in each episode.
Id. Bok declined the offer. Id.
92. See, e.g., ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE LOST SOUL OF HIGHER EDUCATION: CORPORATIZATION,
THE ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND THE END OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (2010).
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President for Research illustrates the problem. There is an
entrepreneurial pride manifest on the pages of the document, which is
entitled “Corporate-Sponsored Research at Penn State.”93 The report,
early in its analysis, boasts that “Penn State has long been a leader in
industry-sponsored research, registering the second or third largest
expenditures. The top university for some time has been Duke ($133
million in 2006),” followed by “Ohio State ($106 million).”94 Two
objectives of the report were to “gain understanding of corporative
motives for partnering with PSU” and to “identify strategies for
increasing participation by industry in PSU research.”95 In this public
document, the report was all too candid about its mission and how it
should be understood:
The purpose of this report is to provide a different viewpoint, a
long-range, more general perspective. In this relationship,
corporations are the buyers and universities the sellers. Thus, it
is essential to appreciate the point of view and the motives of the
purchasers, for whom university research represents only a small
input to large [research and development] operations. Above all,
this project aimed to comprehend what corporations sought from
university research and what arrangements served to fulfill those
needs.96
While there is more, much more, that we might excerpt from the Penn
State report from the Center for Higher Education, we will add only the
following item, which we think bears mightily on the question of
academic freedom and academic integrity:
[F]ocused basic research . . . promises to contribute to the
development of new products [and] is probably the area having
the greatest potential for stimulating additional demand for
university research. This rationale would fit the PSU-Chevron
partnership for coal-conversion technologies or the
93. ROGER L. GEIGER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HIGHER EDUC., CORPORATE-SPONSORED
RESEARCH AT PENN STATE: REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH
(2008), available at
http://www.personal.psu.edu/rlg9/tappingtherichesofscience/Geiger_Corporate_reasearch_at_psu.pd
f. Professor Geiger was then a senior scientist affiliated with the Center for the Study of Higher
Education at Pennsylvania State University. The past head of the University’s higher education
program (1996–2000, 2003–2007), Geiger is now the Distinguished Professor of Education at PSU.
His two principal fields of study are the history of American higher education and research
universities.
Faculty
Directory:
Roger
Geiger,
PENN
STATE
C.
EDUC.,
http://www.ed.psu.edu/educ/eps/higher-education/directory/roger-geiger (last visited May 4, 2012).
94. GEIGER, supra note 93, at 2.
95. Id.
96. GEIGER, supra note 93, at 2–3 (emphasis added).
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[Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)]-Novartis pact for
continuous manufacturing. DuPont’s partnership with MIT
similarly represents initiatives in biomaterials that have yielded
publications and patents—knowledge and potential products.97
To its credit, Penn State was open about its commercial objectives
and how best to attain them. In the present culture, such objectives are
held out to be realist goals worthy of any institution of higher education
concerned about its survival in these ever-difficult economic times.
Tellingly, educators such as Robert Maynard Hutchins and Derek Bok
stand to obstruct such goals. Their messages pose a clear and present
danger to the Entrepreneurial Academy.98
Recall that we have been talking about experts and expert knowledge
and how the First Amendment might be recalibrated so as to protect, in
certain instances, the work product of such experts and the knowledge
they produce. This is true whether the disciplinary knowledge concerns
pharmaceutical research,99 findings on the effects of smoking,100 climate
change studies,101 or any host of other areas where expert knowledge is
97. Id. at 27.
98. See PATRICIA A. PELFREY, ENTREPRENEURIAL PRESIDENT: RICHARD ATKINSON AND THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 1995–2003, at xiv, 102–14 (2012) (noting the expansion of the
University’s research enterprise into new forms of scientific research with industry).
99. See, e.g., Eric G. Campbell, Doctors and Drug Companies—Scrutinizing Influential
Relations, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1796, 1796 (2007) (“[R]esearch has shown that physicianindustry relationships do influence prescribing behavior.” (citation omitted)). In this regard, note
that one of the reasons Dean Post accords special protection to certain experts, such as doctors,
POST, supra note 2, at 44–46, is because of the public need to obtain reliable information from these
experts. Cf. id. at 129–30 n.62 (noting malpractice standards). Is the malpractice hurdle always
enough to protect the well-being of patients in light of the problems Dr. Campbell identified? See
also MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT xviii–xix (2004) (noting, among other things, that much industry research
in this area is “seriously flawed, leading doctors to believe that new drugs are generally more
effective and safer than they actually are”).
100. See, e.g., Rycharde Manne, Smoking and Alzheimer’s Disease: Tobacco Companies [sic]
Research Bias Revealed, SCIENCE 2.0 (Feb. 20, 2010),
http://www.science20.com/florilegium/blog/smoking_and_alzheimers_disease_tobacco_companies
_research_bias_revealed (noting that a “University of California at San Francisco [(UCSF)] team
reviewed 43 published studies from 1984 to 2007” and that the authors of “a quarter of the studies
had an affiliation with the tobacco industry. The UCSF team determined that . . . smoking nearly
doubled the risk of [Alzheimer’s Disease (AD)].” And it found, by contrast, “that studies authored
by individuals with tobacco industry affiliations [suggested] that . . . smoking protects against AD”).
101. See, e.g., INTEGRITY IN SCI. PROJECT, CTR. FOR SCI. PUB. INTEREST, BIG OIL U., at v (2008),
available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/bigoilu.pdf (commenting that, as far as oil companies are
concerned, “universities . . . are accepting extensive industry controls over the research process—
controls that violate hallowed traditions of academic independence”). After detailing some of the
notable abuses that occur owing to the marriage of oil money and university research, the Center for
Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) report offers five recommendations for preserving real
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shaped by industry imperatives. All of the above prompts us to ask:
(1) Will industry-financed and -controlled research at
universities be entitled to the special protection Post
envisions?
(2) If so, why?—and if not, will that not affect much of the
research done today in universities?
(3) How are judges, such as Judge Ambro, to evaluate the
democratic competence of industry-funded experts (both
within and outside of the university) against that of less wellfinanced experts?
The irony should not escape us: if the problems associated with the
alliance between industry and the academy are not remedied in some
significant way, the possible result is First Amendment protection for the
research produced by for-profit experts—even though pecuniary
influences corrupt the integrity of the educational endeavor.
This dilemma is indicative of a larger issue relating to certain tenets
of First Amendment jurisprudence, such as those concerning the
commercial speech doctrine.102 The issue to which we refer is the need
(typically ignored in the legal academy) to understand law in the culture
in which it is rooted. That is, can one fashion a realistic and effective
jurisprudence of commercial speech or academic freedom103 without
academic integrity and independence. Id. at 15. In the interest of full disclosure, it should be
mentioned that one of the authors of this Foreword (Ron Collins) once worked with CSPI and was
one of the co-founders of the Integrity in Science Project, though he did not work on the report
herein cited.
102. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 24, at xxx–xxxviii, 67–135 (discussing, with some
satirical flair, how modern capitalism shapes our commercial culture and the law of free speech
governing it). In this regard, we question whether the contemporary commercial speech doctrine is
actually grounded in the truth-falsity informational soil that Dean Post suggests. Compare id. at 67–
77, and Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Foreword: The Landmark Free-Speech Case that
Wasn’t: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1024–1042 (2004), with POST,
supra note 2, at 40–41, 126–128 nn.47–53. The Central Hudson test that governed at the time that
Dean Post wrote his book, see POST, supra, at 127 n.52, has now been eclipsed by another test, one
yet more favorable to commercial speakers. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct.
2653, 2675–76 (2011) (Breyer J., dissenting).
103. A culture that does not value truth and knowledge for its own sake is more inclined to
discount the value of the pursuit of uninhibited knowledge; therefore, it is more likely to view
professors as no more than public employees subject to the censorial whims of their employers.
Hence, the fear is real that the principle of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), that public
employees speaking pursuant to their official duties do not enjoy First Amendment free-speech
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being duly mindful of the demands of a highly capitalistic culture such
as ours? In that culture, is it likely that the ideal of disciplinary
knowledge in the academy and outside of it would be readily aligned
with black and white doctrinal formulas for truth and falsity?
Even in the doctor-patient realm, where malpractice standards seem to
demand a strict dichotomy between truth and falsity, an ever-increasing
body of counter-measures passed in the name of “tort reform” routinely
undercut the norm of democratic competence. Is not the noble paradigm
that Dean Post offers concerning such standards of medical competence
emasculated each time a law enacted in the name of “tort reform”
renders it more difficult to prevail in malpractice actions?104 The fact is,
for better or worse, that some people would willingly sacrifice a measure
of truth guaranteed to them by way of a malpractice action if they
thought (however mistakenly) that the skyrocketing cost of their medical
care would decrease.105 Here again, the operational norms of our
commercial culture must be taken into account.106 To ignore the
demands of the popular culture is to be fanciful, to create a false sense of
normative value, and ultimately to invite (albeit unintentionally)
undemocratic consequences that could even be seen, in some quarters, as
elitist.
It might be said, and understandably so, that the answer to the
questions raised above concerning the commercialization of knowledge
is the sort of thing that Post would flesh out in his sociology of
knowledge. After all, such a sociology would require a process of
discerning which particular expert-knowledge practices best fit into the
disciplinary norm and which do not, or which might not be given much

protections, might extend to the academic realm. As Dean Post astutely puts it: “The idea is
apparently that public universities are proprietary institutions which hire faculty in order to
communicate a proprietary message.” POST, supra note 2, at 91. While we certainly agree with
Dean Post as to the undesirability of thus applying Garcetti, is it entirely unreasonable for the Court
to see the academy through a proprietary lens when many of those who govern it so often act in
proprietary ways?
104. For example, consider the impact of caps on damages, limits on contingency fees,
introduction of collateral source rules, stricter statutes of limitation rules, changes in burden of proof
rules, and mandatory arbitration requirements, among other “reforms.”
105. See Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical
Malpractice Settlement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S183, S209 (2007) (noting that because of
certain kinds of tort reform, “doctors may (rationally) exercise a lower level of care[, knowing] that
they are partially insulated from liability”).
106. In this respect, we concur in the opinion of Dean Post as to the value of the essay by Bruce
Johnson and Sarah Duran, supra note 19, which he appropriately characterizes as “direct[ing] our
attention to the reality that underlies [First Amendment] doctrine.” Post, supra note 18, at 550. That
basic maxim informs much of what we have written in this Foreword.
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professional credence. That process, complicated as it would be, could
thus speak to the kinds of issues we have been discussing. Even so, there
seems to be a larger issue at stake here. That is, would not a certain
architectonic theory of education107 have to exist antecedent to the kind
of sociology of knowledge Dean Post calls for? And would not that
theory of education have to be shaped in such a way that it would be
compatible with the vision of academic freedom that Post values? Thus
understood, some overarching theory of education108 would be a
necessary blueprint for any sociology of knowledge concerned about
safeguarding academic freedom, properly understood.
WHAT WE VALUE AND WHY
The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it
has gained a hearing.109
The most glorious of utopian roads are spotted with realist potholes,
which obstruct the noblest of idealistic journeys. This is not to deny the
uplifting value of idealism without which our world would be dull and
dreadful. Most assuredly, idealism has its place in life and law. But
unless its steel is tested time and again, it may prove counterproductive
to the very ends to which it aspires. When that occurs, the pursuit of
utopian ideals can produce dystopian misfortunes. This is no less true in
the area of contemporary First Amendment law as its jurisprudence
plays out in our culture.
All said, is there not something admirable in Robert Post’s attempt to
preserve academic freedom, properly understood, in our modern world?
Similarly, is there not something venerable in his attempt to secure a
safe harbor for knowledge? Such questions answer themselves. On that
score we have no quarrel with Dean Post’s laudable objectives. If we
display some intermittent pause, if we raise a few genial questions, it is

107. Given Dean Post’s objectives, it would seem that such educational architecture would have
to be considerably freer of commercial taint than it is now.
108. Consider, in this regard, the Hutchins-like view of education offered in Martha C.
Nussbaum’s instructive book, entitled NOT FOR PROFIT: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE
HUMANITIES 13-26 (2012).
109. SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 53 (James Starchy, ed., trans., W.W. Norton
& Co., Inc. 1961) (1928). In this small but thought-provoking work, the father of psychoanalysis
took aim at religious ideas, which he saw more as the product of wish fulfillment than rationalist
judgment. “Thus,” Dr. Freud explained, “we call a belief an illusion when a wish-fulfillment is a
prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations to reality, just as the
illusion sets no store by verification.” Id. at 31.
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because we are concerned how to best secure his goals without forfeiting
our values. Much of that same spirit informs the illuminating
commentaries that follow in this Symposium.
Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom forces those of us in
the First Amendment and constitutional communities to confront
difficult questions in ways that most other works have not.110 It is one
thing to raise questions, as we have done here; it is yet another to
attempt to answer them in some relatively coherent and satisfactory
ways. Too often academics demand too much of their scholarly
counterparts in the works they author. There is an unrealistic and unfair
sense that an author must, in a single work, say all that needs to be said
and cure all that needs to be cured. If such a work is lacking in this
regard, it is in jeopardy of being discounted. In the spirit of the First
Amendment, we reject such summary judgments. A work is better
judged, in important part, by its ability to point to problems we have not
heretofore viewed as problematic. If that is the evaluative yardstick,
Dean Post has done us a good turn by alerting us to the fact that
smugness about First Amendment doctrine generally, and about its
applicability to academic freedom in particular, might be little more than
a case of conceited folly.
Justice Holmes once quipped: “The thing I . . . want to do is to put as
many new ideas into the law as I can, to show how particular solutions
involve general theory.”111 In that respect, Dean Post may have his
Holmesian side. And like the great jurist before him, Post has ventured
to do something of the same. While it is easy to overlook, part of
Holmes’s enduring greatness is the controversy his ideas still spark in
the minds and hearts of so many. Thus, his legacy lives. When one views
that fact from a First Amendment perspective, what becomes apparent is
that uniformity of thought is the graveyard where ideas go to die.
As we have suggested, the most worthwhile books on free speech
inspire readers to deliberate on both their goals and the means by which
110. One exception, however, is ERIC BARENDT, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 15–49, 161–201 (2010), which is a most thoughtful work, one that would
make for a welcome companion volume to Dean Post’s book. Given the constraints of this
Foreword, we did not feel it prudent to compare and contrast the respective ideas of Professors
Barendt and Post, which could well require yet another symposium. Even so, a dialogue between
the two has already begun. See id. at viii (“Professor James Weinstein invited me to a workshop and
panel discussion at Arizona State University . . . in March 2009, where aspects of academic freedom
and the freedom to raise unorthodox ideas in universities were treated to vigorous debate.”
Apparently, Dean Post was a part of that dialogue.).
111. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Patrick Sheehan (Dec. 15, 1912), in HOLMES—
SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE: THE LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND CANON
PATRICK AUGUSTINE SHEEHAN 56 (David H. Burton ed., 1976).
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they might be secured. Such works attract minds, not converts; they
begin inquiry, not end it; they invite diversity, not uniformity;112 and
they may even help us to realize what was once thought unrealizable.
True to its worth, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom first
prods us to think about an issue that most have not really considered, at
least not in any serious and extended way.113
With all of the above as our lodestar, we embarked upon the journey
that led to this Foreword. In what follows, lawyers from different walks
of life (the academy, the bench, and the bar) come together to partake in
an old Madisonian ritual. It is one in which free men and women
exchange ideas in the hope that they might clarify their thought, remedy
their problems, preserve their values, and thereby improve their lot. For
helping to make that possible, a debt of gratitude is owed to all of the
scholars contributing to this Symposium, and to Dean Robert Post
especially.

112. Something of the same mindset was at work in a recent symposium centered on the topic of
free speech and participatory democracy. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free
Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 (2011) and the articles following it; see also James Weinstein,
Introduction, 97 VA. L. REV. vii, viii (2011) (“The group [that constitutes this symposium] was
formed to critically examine in written discussion two leading theories of contemporary free speech
doctrine, one based on participatory democracy and the other on individual autonomy. The
discussion began with Robert Post and me writing separate statements defending our somewhat
different conceptions of participatory democracy as the best overall theory of free speech. The other
members of the group then filed critiques of these target articles.”). Happily, the editors of the
Washington Law Review have seen fit to compile a listing of Dean Post’s many writings on free
speech. See Robert C. Post, Selected Bibliography First Amendment Scholarship, 87 WASH. L. REV.
565 (2012).
113. Cf. supra text accompanying note 111. We suspect that the topic of academic freedom and
free speech will garner yet further attention in the future, in which case Dean Post’s book and this
Symposium will likely draw added notice. Meanwhile, Professor David Rabban is among the more
thoughtful scholars now tilling these fields and is sure to offer more by way of adding his own
insights to the mix. Consider the following works by Professor Rabban: Academic Freedom,
Individual or Institutional?, 87 ACADEME 16 (2001); Academic Freedom, Professionalism, and
Intramural Speech, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM: AN EVERYDAY CONCERN 77 (Ernst Benjamin &
Donald R. Wagner eds.,1994); Does Professional Education Constrain Academic Freedom?, 43 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 358 (1993); Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEX. L. REV.
1405 (1988); and A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom
Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (1990).

